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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Anthony Tenon seeks review of the District Court’s orders 
dismissing his civil rights action against several defendants and awarding summary 
judgment to the remaining defendants.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm 
in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
Tenon, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against William Dreibelbis, a health care administrator at the State Correctional 
Institution at Smithfield (SCI-Smithfield), Dr. Ronald Long and Dr. Agawal, both 
physicians, and two physician assistants, Josh Mahute1 and Sean Tyson, all employed at 
SCI-Smithfield.  On July 16, 2010, Tenon suffered a diabetic seizure in his prison cell, 
causing him to fall and fracture his jaw.  In his complaint, he alleges that the defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs stemming from his injury, 
causing him to suffer severe, unnecessary pain and permanent disfigurement, and thereby 
violating his civil rights.  Tenon also asserts a state law claim for negligence.   
The Magistrate Judge initially screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.          
§ 1915A and recommended dismissing all of the claims without prejudice for failure to 
state a claim, except those against defendant Drebeilbis.  In response, Tenon filed an 
amended complaint.  The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R), 
which the District Court adopted as its opinion, dismissing the § 1983 claims against 
Tyson, Mahute and Dr. Agawal with prejudice and declining to exercise supplemental 
                                              
1 Josh Mahute’s name is misspelled as “Mahuut” in the caption and throughout Tenon’s 
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jurisdiction over the state law claims.  The case then proceeded against defendants 
Dreibelbis and Long; after discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in 
their favor.  This appeal ensued.2 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA is plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We exercise plenary review over an order granting summary 
judgment.  DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary judgment is 
proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; 
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). 
     I. 
 Tenon alleges that, immediately after his injury, he was examined by Defendant 
Mahute.  Tenon complained that he could not open his jaw and that it was causing him 
excruciating pain.  After concluding that the jaw was likely broken, Mahute ordered an x-
ray, and prescribed Motrin and a “soft diet.”3  There appears no dispute that Tenon never 
                                                                                                                                                  
pleadings. 
2  Tenon has waived his right to appeal the District Court’s decision to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 
176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (issues not raised in an opening brief are deemed waived); see 
also LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (although 
“appellate courts generally do not hold pro se litigants rigidly to the formal briefing 
standards . . . we need not manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se, 
especially when he has raised an issue below and elected not to pursue it on appeal.”). 
3  Throughout his complaint, Tenon incorrectly refers to the diet ordered by Mahute as a 
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received the soft diet.  On July 22, 2010, six days after the injury, Tenon’s jaw was x-
rayed; he was also examined and informed by defendant Tyson that he had a single 
fracture to his jaw.  Tenon informed Tyson that he was unable to eat because he had not 
yet received the soft diet.  Tyson responded that the soft diet was likely delayed because 
of “paperwork.”  On July 29th, Tenon was examined by Dr. Agawal.  Tenon reiterated 
his complaint that he had yet to receive a soft diet, and complained to Agawal that the 
Motrin was ineffective for the pain.  According to Tenon, Agawal confirmed the fracture 
and informed Tenon that he would be scheduled for surgery.   
The record indicates that Tenon made additional efforts to seek relief for his pain 
and obtain a soft diet.  On July 30, 2010, he submitted a “Sick Call Request” to the 
medical department, requesting to be seen by a physician’s assistant because the pain 
medication for his “broken jaw” was “not working at all.”  There was no response to this 
request.  On August 5, 2010, he submitted an “Inmate Request Slip to Staff Member” 
addressed to defendant Long, complaining that his previous sick call request went 
unheard, and that he was unable to sleep or eat because of the “extreme pain” in his 
broken jaw and the delay in getting it fixed.  According to Tenon, there was no response.  
On August 14th, nearly one month after his injury, Tenon filed a second “Sick Call 
Request” to the medical department seeking “stronger pain medication” because the 
“Motrin is not working at all.”  On August 19, he filed another “inmate request” with 
Defendant Long, outlining the lack of medical treatment and severe pain, and inquiring 
                                                                                                                                                  
“liquid,” rather than a soft diet.   
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about getting his jaw fixed.  On that date, he also filed an official grievance with the 
prison, detailing his pain and lack of medical care.  He was transported five days later to 
the Medical Hospital of S.C.I. Pittsburgh, where he was examined by Dr. Chung, a 
maxillofacial specialist.  Dr. Chung allegedly informed Tenon that he sustained three 
fractures to his jaw, two on the left and one on the right, but that the right fracture had 
already started to fuse on its own.  On September 17, 2010, Dr. Chung surgically repaired 
Tenon’s left jaw.     
 In his complaint, Tenon alleges that he was denied the soft diet by the dining hall 
and forced to try to eat solid foods because “either Defendant Mahuut (sic) did not place 
the [soft diet] order” or “Defendant Dreibelbis did not approve” it.  As a result of his 
“[im]proper diet,” his “diabetes and blood sugar levels [were] out of whack causing 
sickness.”  He further alleges that defendants Mahute and Tyson failed to respond to his 
sick call requests, Dr. Long failed to respond to his direct inmate requests, and Dr. 
Agawal failed to address his complaints regarding the severity of his pain and improper 
diet.  He maintains that, as a direct result of the delay in treatment, the fracture on the 
right side of his jaw healed improperly, leaving him with a permanent crooked jaw line, 
which prevents him from chewing properly.   
     II. 
 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires courts to dismiss a prisoner 
civil rights suit if the action is frivolous or does not state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).  To avoid dismissal, the facts as plead must 
 6 
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-
79 (2009) (citation omitted).  To state a claim for a violation under the Eighth 
Amendment, Tenon must allege “(1) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to 
[his] medical needs and (2) that those needs were serious.”  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 
192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).  To succeed 
on his claim, the first prong requires Tenon to establish that objectively the deprivation of 
a basic human need was “sufficiently serious.”   Under the second prong, he must prove 
that, subjectively, the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”  
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).  The District Court properly concluded that 
his fractured jaw, and resulting pain, constituted an objectively serious medical need.  See 
Wise v. Lappin, 674 F.3d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that “a painful broken jaw 
constituted an objectively serious medical need”).  The District Court dismissed the 
claims against defendants Mahute, Tyson, and Agawal, finding that Tenon failed to 
allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that they were deliberately indifferent to this serious 
medical need.     
 We agree with the District Court that the allegations against Tyson do not support 
an inference that he acted with deliberate indifference.  Nearly a week after the injury, 
Tyson examined Tenon and informed him that, as confirmed by the x-ray, his jaw was 
fractured.  He put Tenon on the “sick call list” to be seen by a medical doctor.  In 
response to Tenon’s complaint that he had not yet received the soft diet, Tyson indicated 
that the delay could be the result of “paperwork.”  Tenon does not allege that he followed 
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up directly with Tyson regarding the lack of soft diet or any other medical care; his “sick 
call request” was not directed to Tyson or any specific medical provider.  It cannot 
plausibly be inferred from these facts -- which suggest that Tyson believed that the soft 
diet was ordered -- that he was deliberately indifferent to Tenon’s medical needs.  See 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (a person acts with deliberate indifference 
when “he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”); see also 
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009) (to survive sua sponte 
screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” 
to show that the claim is facially plausible). 
 With respect to Mahute, the District Court noted that he provided immediate and 
proper care to Tenon on the day he was injured.  It concluded that Tenon failed to allege 
facts to support a claim that, after that date, Mahute was aware he was being denied 
adequate medical care.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  The District 
Court neglected to address the claim, added to the amended complaint, that Mahute failed 
to order the soft diet.  This allegation was sufficient to state a claim for relief, particularly 
where it is alleged that Mahute believed at the time that the jaw was broken.  See Estelle, 
429 U.S. at 103 (The Eighth Amendment safeguards the prisoner against a lack of 
medical care that ‘may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve 
any penological purpose.”); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding 
deliberate indifference “where prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical 
treatment . . . and such denial exposes the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of 
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tangible residual injury”); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A 
core principle of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the area of medical care is that 
prison officials with knowledge of the need for care may not, by failing to provide care, 
delaying care, or providing grossly inadequate care, cause a prisoner to needlessly suffer 
the pain resulting from his or her illness.”).  However, the summary judgment record, 
which includes a “Healthy Therapeutic Diet Order Form” and a “Physician’s Order 
Form,” both signed by Mahute, clearly establishes that Mahute ordered a soft diet for 
Tenon.  Because it is clear the claim could not survive judgment as a matter of law, we 
will not disturb the District Court’s order dismissing it.    
 In dismissing the claim against Dr. Agawal, the District Court noted that, 
according to the complaint, Tenon told Agawal the Motrin was “effective” in treating the 
pain.  This was clearly a typographical error by Tenon.  In addition to the delay in 
surgery, the crux of Tenon’s claims -- made clear throughout the complaint and its 
attachments – is that the Motrin was ineffective in treating his pain.4  See U.S. Express 
Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (in determining whether a 
complaint states a claim for relief, courts accept as true the allegations in the complaint 
and its attachments, as well as reasonable inferences construed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiffs).  Indeed, the R&R then acknowledges that Tenon asked Dr. Agawal for 
“stronger pain medication” for his “severe jaw pain,” a request which would belie an 
                                              
4  For example, the Sick Call Request, dated July 30, 2010, the day after Tenon was seen 
by Dr. Agawal, states that he needs “stronger pain medication” because the “[M]otrin is 
not working at all.” 
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assertion that the medication was effective.   Furthermore, it was Dr. Agawal who 
confirmed that Tenon required surgery for his jaw fracture.  In the face of that knowledge 
and the knowledge that it had been nearly two weeks since the injury, yet the prescribed 
soft diet had not been provided, Tenon’s allegations that Agawal failed to respond to his 
claims for stronger pain medication for his “excruciating pain” are sufficiently serious to 
support an Eighth Amendment claim.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; Rouse, 182 F.2d at 
197 (deliberate indifference is demonstrated where “a prison official . . . knows of a 
prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it”).  
Accordingly, the District Court erred in dismissing the claims against Dr. Agawal.    
       III. 
 The remaining question is whether the summary judgment record established that 
defendants Long and Dreibelbis were deliberately indifferent to Tenon’s serious medical 
need “by intentionally denying or delaying medical care.”  Giles v. Kearney 571 F.3d 
318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 In granting summary judgment to defendant Long, the District Court concluded 
that his “only involvement in the treatment of Plaintiff’s jaw injuries was that Plaintiff 
sent him two request slips.”  It further concluded that, because Tenon “had been fully 
evaluated by the prison medical staff, and a course of treatment had been recommended[, 
a]ny failure of Defendant Long to provide treatment beyond the basic medical care 
mandated by the Eighth Amendment speaks more to the adequacy of the medical care 
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than the absolute denial of medical care alleged by Plaintiff, and as such is not a viable 
Eighth Amendment claim.”  We disagree with the District Court’s disposition of this 
claim for two reasons.  First, it mischaracterizes Tenon’s claim.  Contrary to the District 
Court’s conclusion, Tenon’s claim is not a dispute over the adequacy of the treatment or 
the need to pursue one course of treatment over another, either of which generally fails to 
state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment.  See United States v. Fayette 
County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (“When a prisoner had received some 
medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are 
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims 
which sound in state tort law.”) (quotation marks omitted).  Rather, the gravamen of 
Tenon’s claim against Long is that a prescribed course of treatment – a soft diet and 
surgery – were not being provided, and that he was needlessly suffering pain as a result.  
Such a claim is cognizable under the Eighth Amendment.  See White v. Napoleon, 897 
F.2d 103, 109 -10 (3d Cir. 1990) (prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a 
prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “intentionally deny[ ] or delay[ ] medical 
care or intentionally interf[ere] with the treatment once prescribed”) (citing Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 104) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)); Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 
(7th Cir. 2010) (8-week delay in providing effective treatment for dental pain is 
actionable); see also Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968–69 (8th Cir.1995) (3–week delay in 
dental care for infected and impacted tooth where swelling and pus were assessed, 
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coupled with knowledge of inmate's suffering, can support finding of Eighth Amendment 
violation).    
 Second, as the moving party, Long has the burden to demonstrate that there is no 
genuine issue of fact.  Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 
817, 824 (3d Cir. 1951).  The only evidence presented in support of the motion was a 
copy of Tenon’s deposition.  According to Long, the deposition demonstrates that Tenon 
was receiving “ongoing medical care” and, therefore, any failure to respond to the 
medical requests does not demonstrate deliberate indifference.  The “ongoing medical 
care” Long refers to is Tenon being seen by Mahute, Tyson, and Agawal, and being 
recommended for surgery.   Tenon had alleged that despite these “medical interventions,” 
as Long refers to them, he did not receive the prescribed care.  The deposition does not 
negate that contention.  The Inmate to Staff Requests are probative evidence that Dr. 
Long was aware of Tenon’s complaints and, absent any evidence to the contrary – which 
Dr. Long failed to provide − is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Tenon, as we must, we cannot agree with the 
District Court that summary judgment was warranted.5   
   A § 1983 action cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior.  See Rode 
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).   Defendant Dreibelbis must have 
                                              
5  Dr. Long argued that the claims against him should be dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies because Tenon failed to name him in his grievance.  We agree 
with the District Court that Tenon has overcome this procedural default because the 
Initial Review Response to the grievance clearly indicates that Long was put on notice of 
the claim.  See Williams v. Bear, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 2007).   
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personal involvement, including participation, or actual knowledge and acquiescence, to 
be liable.  Id.  Tenon alleged that Dreibelbis had direct knowledge of his serious medical 
injury but failed to approve the prescribed treatment and unreasonably delayed the 
recommended treatment.  We agree with the District Court that Dreibelbis met his burden 
to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of fact regarding whether he was 
deliberately indifferent to Long’s medical needs.  In support of his motion for summary 
judgment, Dreibelbis included an affidavit in which he averred that, as the Corrections 
Health Care Administrator (CHCA), he was responsible for the “overall administrative 
operation of the Health Care Department at SCI-Smithfield” but was “not responsible for 
overseeing and approving the findings and recommendations of doctors and physicians 
assistants regarding treatment, medication or diets.”  Dreibelbis Aff., ¶¶ 2, 4.  He 
indicated that “Corizon,” a medical company that contracts with the DOC for medical 
services, was responsible for approving all physicians’ orders and scheduling surgeries. 
Id. at ¶¶ 5, 17.  Dreibelbis’ sole involvement appears to be in reviewing Tenon's 
administrative complaint related to this suit.  Merely responding to or reviewing an 
inmate grievance does not rise to the level of personal involvement necessary to allege an 
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.  See Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d at 1208.  
Accordingly, summary judgment was warranted on this claim.6    
                                                                                                                                                  
 
6  Dreibelbis stated that the scheduling of the surgery was to be done by the “Corizon 
Clinical Coordinator,” and approved by “Corizon Clinical Review.”  Dreibelbis Aff., ¶17.  
On remand, Tenon may wish to again seek leave to amend the complaint to name the 
proper defendants.  Allowing any such amendment is, of course, within the discretion of 
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 Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the dismissal of the claims against 
defendants Tyson and Mahute, and the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant 
Dreibelbis.  We will vacate the dismissal of the claims against Dr. Agawal, and the grant 
of summary judgment in favor of defendant Long, and remand for further proceedings on 
those claims.7   
    







                                                                                                                                                  
the District Court. 
7 In its August 22, 2012 order, the District Court declined to appoint Tenon 
counsel, after finding that he could present his own case.  We agree with its assessment at 
that time, and find no abuse of discretion.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“The plaintiff's ability to present his or her case is, of course, a significant factor 
that must be considered in determining whether to appoint counsel.”).  That said, the 
District Court indicated its willingness to revisit this issue in the future.  Given the 
present stage of the case, and the medical evidence that may be involved, the Court may 
wish to again consider the Tabron factors on remand.  We take no position on whether 
that request should be granted.  
